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ABSTRACT
Conceptual engineering projects have been criticized for creating
discontinuities of subject-matter and, as a result, discontinuities in inquiries:
call this the Change of Subject objection. In this paper, I explore a way of
dealing with the objection that clarifies its scope and eventually downplays
it. First, two strategies aimed at saving subject-continuity are examined and
found wanting: Herman Cappelen’s appeal to topics, and the account in
terms of concept function. Second, the idea is introduced that one can begin
an object-level inquiry either with a ‘semantically conservative’ approach,
whereby semantic change is not permitted, or with a ‘semantically
progressive’ approach, whereby semantic change is permitted. This
distinction helps one significantly downplay the Change of Subject objection.
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1. The change of subject objection to conceptual engineering
Conceptual engineering is characterized by Cappelen (2018, 3), and Cap-
pelen and Plunkett (2020, 7), as the process of ‘assessing and improving
our representational devices’. In the current debate, paradigmatic pro-
jects falling under this rubric involve: (a) an inquirer, or a community of
inquirers, focussing on the meaning of a certain term (usually regarded
as proxy for the concept the term expresses), (b) arguing for such mean-
ing’s defectiveness along a certain dimension, and (c) proposing a
change that they deem conducive to some form of representational pro-
gress. In the history of analytic philosophy, authors who explicitly go
through these steps are Tarski (1935), Carnap (1950) and Quine (1960).
In more recent times, we find this methodology explicitly adopted by
Haslanger (2000), who aims at offering an ameliorative revision of the
concepts of race and gender; and Scharp (2013), who urges a replacement
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of the truth concept in order to overcome the liar paradox. However, the
number of theorists who can be interpreted as pursuing a conceptual
engineering project – although they do not explicitly frame their
inquiry in this way – is potentially much higher (see Brun 2016). Cappelen
(2018) includes (among others) Clark and Chalmers on ‘belief’, and Railton
on moral ‘good’ and ‘ought’. One could add, to name but a few authors,
Hempel on ‘confirmation’, Craig on ‘knowledge’, Parfit on ‘personal iden-
tity’ and Sider on ‘existence’.
The changes operated by conceptual engineers are standardly
described in terms of revision, or in terms of replacement. Revision typi-
cally occurs when a limited number of relevant features of one and the
same concept is changed. Replacement is the introduction of a numeri-
cally new concept intended to supplant the initial one. Depending on
how one accounts for the semantics of concepts, revision and replace-
ment can, in turn, be thought of as targeting different aspects: for
example, a concept’s intension, its extension, or the rules or principles
that govern its use.
While different descriptions may suit different paradigmatic projects of
conceptual engineering, it is usually agreed that the extent of the concep-
tual revision may, especially to unsympathetic eyes, become problematic.
For, if the changes effected in order to improve a concept were to exceed
a certain limit – which might vary from case to case – the conceptual
engineer may face an objection, which I will call the Change of Subject
Objection.1 In this paper, I will focus on a formulation of this objection
that emphasizes how a change of subject produces a discontinuity in
an inquiry (this formulation is to be found especially in Cappelen 2018,
101–102; Cappelen and Plunkett 2020, 12–13). A disclaimer: in what
follows, I will for ease of exposition describe conceptual engineering as
affecting the intension and extension of a term. While this way of
framing conceptual engineering may not do justice to all the projects cur-
rently gathered under this terminological umbrella, it will allow me to
more fruitfully engage with currently influential views, such as Herman
Cappelen’s, which deal specifically with the change of subject objection.
Here is the formulation of the objection I will consider. Note that it is a
rather broad formulation, targeted at inquirers whose investigation leads to
semantic changes. This breadth of scope is, to my mind, a plus, for there
may well be a general problem of subject-matter continuity for any
1Peter Strawson’s (1963) objection to Carnap’s method of explication (Carnap 1950) is usually associated
to it, but in this paper I wish to set Strawson’s objection aside. For a careful study of Strawson’s argu-
ments, see Pinder (2020a).
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inquirer who faces semantic changes, whether such changes result from
one’s will to ‘engineer’ a concept or not. Suppose one’s inquiry starts with
some initial first-order question, for instance, ‘What are the Fs?’, ‘Are the Fs
such-and-so?’ Suppose these questions are formulated in a language in
which the term ‘F’ has a certain intension and extension, which we
could imagine to be sufficiently determined for the purposes of the inves-
tigation. Suppose now that conceptual change is brought about by the
inquirer, in the form of a revision of the intension and/or extension of
the term ‘F’ (whether such change results from an ‘engineering plan’, or
not, is not relevant at this stage). If the change exceeds certain limits, it
seems that, whatever answer one gives at the end of the inquiry, it will
not be an answer to the initial question, because one of the terms it con-
tains, ‘F’, has undergone excessive semantic change. Consider the follow-
ing example inspired by Cappelen and Plunkett (2020).
Philosopher Erika embarks in an investigation aimed at answering the
question ‘Is free will compatible with determinism?’ In the language she is
employing, ‘free will’ expresses the concept FREE WILL, whose intension
could be spelled out as ‘the capacity to do otherwise’. During her inves-
tigation, Erika finds that the term (and related concept) better describes
a certain number of cases if such intension is changed into ‘being the
sole source of one’s actions’. In her eyes, Erika has ameliorated the
concept because she has increased the fit between the conditions of its
application and the data provided by untutored intuitions. Suppose she
now answers the initial question saying ‘Yes, free will is compatible
with determinism’. A critic could accuse her of having changed the
subject, for the post-engineering term ‘free will’ does not have the
same intension as the pre-engineering ‘free will’. The answer that free
will is compatible with determinism does not concern the property of
being able to do otherwise, it concerns another property. Therefore, it
is not strictly speaking an answer to the initial question. The semantic
change has produced a discontinuity in the initial inquiry.
Inquiry discontinuity may have effects that threaten the very feasibility
or implementation of conceptual engineering projects. For, if an inquiry
gets disrupted by subject-change, then the disruptor might cause com-
munication breakdowns with other speakers (more on this in section 6).
This might be a hurdle to the smooth completion of a conceptual engin-
eering project. To see this, suppose Erika now wishes for the revised
concept of free will to enter the conceptual repertoire of her linguistic
community. To do so, she starts asserting ‘Free will is compatible with
determinism’, and other germane sentences, using ‘free will’ according
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to her own (supposedly non-standard) definition. This might, on some
occasions, create a ‘positive’ communicative disruption that eventually
leads her fellow conversationalists to revise their concept of free will
(see the notions of ‘linguistic intervention’ and ‘conceptual activism’ dis-
cussed by Sterken 2020; Cantalamessa 2021). It is safe to say, however,
that on many other occasions this kind of use would create misunder-
standings, and confusion as to what is at stake in the very question
under examination. This kind of confusion would plausibly pose a signifi-
cant obstacle to the achievement of Erika’s goal – namely, the introduc-
tion of the revised free will concept within a wider linguistic
community. If inquiry disruption has these implications, then the task of
addressing the inquiry-discontinuity version of the subject change objec-
tion will at some point connect with the task of addressing problems
regarding the feasibility and implementation of conceptual engineering
projects.
The inquirer targeted by the change of subject objection seems to
have two reply options: (i) either argue that (provided certain conditions)
no subject discontinuity has been produced; or (ii) argue that the subject
discontinuity is not problematic. In Sections 2 and 3, I will examine two
responses of the first kind, which invoke the notions of ‘topic’ and
‘concept function’ respectively. After having found these strategies
wanting, I will move on to exploring (in Sections 4–6) an answer of the
second kind. I will argue that certain inquiries can be approached by fac-
toring in subject-change from the very beginning. This helps one signifi-
cantly downplay the subject-change objection.
2. Cappelen’s topics
In response to the objection just presented, Cappelen (2018) invokes
topics. He argues that, since topics are more coarse-grained than inten-
sion and extension, we can have continuity of topic even if the intension
or extension of some key concepts has undergone change. In turn, one
may say that continuity in topic ensures continuity in inquiry.
Cappelen starts by presenting the notion of samesaying. For many
expressions, we can issue disquotational speech reports in terms of same-
saying. Suppose that A says ‘Serena is strong’ in context C1 and that B says
‘Serena is strong’ in context C2. Suppose A and B use ‘strong’ relative to
different comparison classes (say, tennis players and celebrities). As a
result, the occurrence of ‘strong’ in C1 has a different intension and exten-
sion than the occurrence of ‘strong’ in C2. From our speech-reporting
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context C3, we can issue a collective, cross-contextual report like the fol-
lowing: ‘A and B both said that Serena is strong’.
Cappelen builds on this result in order to argue for the existence of
topics (2018, 113). We may reconstruct his argument as follows. First, as
already seen, we can correctly report A and B as both having said that
x is F even though their uses of ‘F’ had different intensions and/or exten-
sions (in their respective contexts). If this is the case, then A and B said the
same. If A and B said the same, then their topic is the same. If this is the
case, then one can have sameness of topic despite differences in inten-
sion and/or extension.
In his examples on samesaying, Cappelen seems to focus on speech-
reporting contexts (like C3) where A and B said the same for (hypothetical)
current conversational purposes (within C3). However, purposes can shift
within one and the same speech-reporting context. This implies that,
with little reflection, it is possible to also correctly describe A and B as
not saying the same. The following example illustrates the idea.
Suppose a journalist is collecting evidence regarding whether a certain
prisoner was tortured in a detention facility. She examines reports issued
by the United Nations, which define torture as ‘any act inflicting severe
suffering, physical or mental, in order to obtain information or to
punish’, as well as reports by the U.S. department of justice, which
defines torture as ‘any act inflicting pain rising to the level of death,
organ failure, or the permanent impairment of a significant body func-
tion’.2 Suppose the prisoner did experience organ failure as a conse-
quence of how they were treated; so, the U.N. documents and the U.S.
Justice Department documents both state: ‘The prisoner was tortured’.
There is a clear sense in which these reports say the same – that the pris-
oner was tortured. Yet, the journalist might wish to highlight that strictly
speaking, the U.N. documents and the U.S. documents do not say the
same. The U.N. documents say that the prisoner was the victim of acts
inflicting severe suffering, physical or mental, in order to obtain infor-
mation or to punish; the U.S. documents say that the prisoner was the
victim of acts inflicting pain rising to the level of death, organ failure, or
the permanent impairment of a significant body function. Although
both statements happen to be true of the prisoner in question, fully spel-
ling them out might help one to stress that, if things had gone otherwise
and the prisoner had not suffered organ failure, the documents would
2See United Nations (1984, 85) and U.S. Department of Justice (2002, 340A), as referenced by Plunkett
and Sundell (2013, 19).
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have made contradictory claims. This might be considered deeply
problematic.
In light of these observations, one may ask: are the U.N. and the U.S.
remarks about the same topic? To the extent that they say the same, it
seems like they are, for they are about whether the prisoner was tortured,
or about torture. To the extent that they do not say the same, it seems like
they are not, for they are about whether the prisoner underwent different
types of treatment (with certain specific consequences). Which consider-
ations settle the question? In this particular case, there seems to be no
determinate answer.
One could reply that, as long as it is possible to report the two occur-
rences as saying the same in a broad sense of ‘saying the same’, then their
topic is the same. This may be compatible with them not saying the same
in some other, narrower sense of this term. Yet, the author of the reply
could go on, the broad sense of samesaying should have pride of place
within our linguistic practices, because it prevents judging that topic
changes too much and too often and, therefore, ensures stability in the
way conversations are accounted for.
According to this reply, the broad sense of samesaying trades precision
for stability as far as topic is concerned. Is that a generally desirable trade-
off, though? Many conversational contexts, including contexts where
(e.g.) the violation of human rights is at issue, and philosophical contexts,
demand higher precision than normal. In these higher-precision contexts,
our judgements may speak against samesaying reports in exactly this
broader sense. Plus, in the same contexts, one could always grant same-
saying in the broader sense, but regard it as too loose to give informative
data as to sameness of topic given the standards of precision at hand.
Appeals to the broad sense of samesaying can therefore be easily
undercut.
The foregoing discussion was focussed on just one example. Yet, I
believe the phenomenon I am pointing at can involve any term, and
importantly also terms that are of interest to conceptual engineers. I
leave it as an exercise to the reader to devise similar examples with
terms like ‘marriage’, ‘gene’, ‘knowledge’, and so on.
The upshot of this is that samesaying judgements are unstable.3 In
each particular instance of conceptual engineering, it is possible to
counter samesaying reports with reports to the effect that the speakers
did not say the same. So, in each particular instance of conceptual
3For a similar point, see also Schroeter and Schroeter (2020).
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engineering, it will be difficult to offer convincing arguments about same-
saying. Since samesaying determines (or is a diagnostics for) sameness of
topic, it is going to be equally difficult, in each particular instance of con-
ceptual engineering, to offer convincing arguments as to sameness of
topic.
In all fairness, Cappelen does allow that whether two concepts are
about the same topic can be contested (2018, 116, 119), and seems to
regard this instability of verdicts as a feature, not a bug. Yet, if my argu-
ment is right, it will basically always be possible to contest sameness of
topic. If this is so, then it seems like the topic-strategy just fares poorly
when it comes to applying it to particular cases. This may raise the ques-
tion: why commit to a strategy with such systematic application issues?
That such application issues obtain looks like a good reason for discarding
the strategy, not for adopting it.
It could also be pointed out that all these remarks do is show that the
notion of samesaying has not been adequately operationalized. While the
notion of samesaying could certainly use some regimentation, I am not
very optimistic that such regimentation could be accomplished. First,
the notion of samesaying is a term of art; surely, it does rely on judge-
ments about whether speakers ‘said the same’, which Cappelen deems
pre-theoretical (cf. Cappelen 2018, 108). Yet, either such judgements
are completely untutored, and hence predictably unstable too; or they
are in turn based on the notion of ‘what is said’ as a term of art. The
problem is whether ‘what is said’ has been adequately operationalized
too. A quick review of the current literature shows that there is no agree-
ment as to what ‘what is said’ is.4 This is a further source of instability.
Second, even if all these problems were solved and ‘samesaying’ were
operationalized, it would still harbour a good amount of context-sensi-
tivity. That is, samesaying may remain relative to a number of parameters
whose value would have to be fixed contextually, thus potentially gener-
ating divergent samesaying verdicts. This by itself would seem sufficient
to derive the instability of the notion of topic, and hence to question the
effectiveness of the strategy proposed by Cappelen. Therefore, even if my
arguments only showed a lack of operationalization, it seems reasonable
4The debate on what is said is divided between minimalist views (Cappelen and Lepore 2005; Borg 2004)
and pragmatic-enrichment views (Bach 1994; Recanati 2001, 2004; Carston 2002; Sperber and Wilson
1986). According to minimalists, what is said is exclusively determined by semantic factors (which may
include the assignment of reference to indexicals and demonstratives); according to the pragmatic
enrichment theorists, what is said is supplemented with contextual elements whose retrieval is not
semantically triggered, but depends on pragmatic processes. For a recent alternative, see Schoubye
and Stokke (2016).
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to doubt that operationalizing ‘samesaying’ will be conducive to a better
answer to the change of subject objection.
3. Appeal to functions
Another possible strategy to deal with the change of subject objection is
to argue that changes in intension and/or extension need not alter the
function of a concept. And as long as the concept’s function is preserved,
continuity of inquiry is arguably safe.
This line of argument is compatible with a number of recent
approaches. According to Prinzing (2017), a concept’s function is that
restricted range of uses corresponding to what the concept was originally
‘designed for’ (intentionally or not). Simion and Kelp (2020) characterize a
concept’s function as its etiological function, i.e. the function that it came
to acquire as a result of its evolution in a system of practices. Haslanger
(2020) and Thomasson (2020) also emphasize the role of function as a
guide for conceptual engineering and as a resource to appeal to when
it comes to the change of subject objection.
Haslanger, for instance, reconstructs the semantic changes undergone
by the concept FAMILY in the last decades. She argues that, although such
concept now carves up the logical space differently, by admitting more
human groups as families, the concept has maintained its function: pro-
viding the means for ‘processing information about the coordination of
domestic life, e.g. intimacy, sex, raising of children, economic partnership,
intergenerational transfers of traditions and property’ (2020, 250). As a
result, we can say that one and the same concept, FAMILY, evolved, and
not that one concept, say FAMILY1, were replaced by a numerically
different concept, FAMILY2. Functional continuity may in turn be recruited
in order to argue for inquiry continuity.
The approaches just surveyed all seem to accept that, first, a concept
acquires its function as a result of how linguistic and other relevant
human practices develop; and, second, that no speaker in particular is
responsible for, or in control of, the function that a concept acquires
throughout its history. This implies that philosophers who assign a func-
tion to a certain concept might get things wrong in a number of ways.
One of the ways in which philosophers might err is in how finely they
individuate the concept’s function. Consider the concept FAMILY. It would
seem natural to attribute to it the function sketched by Haslanger,
namely, ‘tracking the coordination of domestic life’ which includes ‘inti-
macy, sex, raising of children, economic partnership, intergenerational
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transfers of traditions and property’, etc. However, one may observe that,
prior to (roughly) the late twentieth century, the coordination of such
practices in the Western world was based on hetero-normative rules
and embedded in a marriage-centred legal system. Post late twentieth
century, the coordination of the same practices (in the Western world)
became governed by other rules, which were non-hetero-normative
and not embedded in a marriage-centred legal system. This may lead
one to conclude that the concept FAMILY has two different functions:
pre late twentieth century, it has the function of tracking the coordination
of domestic life in a hetero-normative, marriage-centred system; post late
twentieth century, it has the function of tracking the coordination of dom-
estic life in a non-hetero-normative, non-marriage-centred system.
Which way of individuating the concept’s function is the right one? I
wish to argue that attempts to answer this question run into a significant
amount of epistemic indeterminacy. To start with, let us suppose that
concept functions exist mind-independently.5 The evidence at our dispo-
sal does not reveal whether the ‘real’ function of a concept is correctly
individuated in the coarse-grained or in the fine-grained way. If we
look, for example, at how the concept FAMILY is used pre and post late
twentieth century, it seems to have the same function of ‘tracking the
coordination of domestic life’. Yet, if we look at the rules and legal
systems that inform domestic life pre and post late twentieth century,
we might be inclined to deny that the concept has the same function
during the former and the latter period.
This affects judgements as to continuity of inquiry. If the concept main-
tained its function, then it seems that inquiries about family pre and post
late twentieth century are in continuity: a putative question about family
posed in (say) 1952 could be felicitously answered by using the concept
FAMILY in 2019, and vice-versa. However, if the concept did not maintain its
function, then there would seem to be a discontinuity between inquiries
about family pre and post late twentieth century. It would then seem infe-
licitous (at least in some cases) to use FAMILY with the function it had in
1952 in order to answer a question about family posed in 2019, and
vice-versa.
In sum, our evidence – about language use, our laws, and our insti-
tutions – does not allow us to clearly identify the concept’s function in
one way or another. If this is the case, then establishing sameness of
5Note that I am not canvassing, or assuming anything about, the ontology of concepts. I am describing
the assumptions of potential, other authors.
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function will become tricky. Since sameness of function would determine
continuity of inquiry, establishing continuity of inquiry would become
tricky as well.6
The function theorist may reply that, with my previous argument, I
merely showed that mind-independent concept function is epistemi-
cally hard to come by. So what? We can still say that a concept
has the function that it is most reasonable to assign to it after
informed reflection about the aims and purposes that it serves for
us. This option is close in spirit to accounts offered by Brigandt
(2010) and Nado (2019), who both emphasize the relativity of a
concept (and hence of a concept’s function) to aims and purposes.
However, epistemic indeterminacy arises here as well. This is
because informed reflection seems incapable to adjudicate whether
FAMILY has the same function in 1952 and 2019, for reasonable con-
siderations support both the function-identity verdict and its opposite.
The former verdict is supported by considerations regarding use, while
the latter is supported by considerations regarding the cultural and
legal environment that grounds such use. If this is so, then the
same problem affects the individuation of ‘attributed’ function just
as it affects the individuation of ‘real’ function.
The function theorist might still reply that, as long as sameness of
function can be achieved relative to at least some aims and purposes,
continuity of inquiry may be ensured. Yet, first of all, an explanation
would be owed as to why certain aims and purposes matter more
than others. Furthermore, even if such explanation were successful,
if my argument is on the right track, it will still be basically always
possible to contest function attributions, because it seems that a con-
cept’s function can basically always be rendered both in a coarse-
grained and in a fine-grained way. This means that the functionalist
strategy can be potentially undermined in each of its particular appli-
cations. Such a systematic application problem may ultimately consti-
tute grounds for discarding the strategy.
6This granularity problem is presumably one of the reasons why function theorists tend to use qualifica-
tions like ‘proper function’ (Thomasson 2020, 444), ‘central function’ (Haslanger 2000, 35), ‘essential
feature’ of a concept’s function (Prinzing 2017, 8). Do these qualifications escape the granularity
problem? There are reasons for thinking they do not. In the family case, one may ask: are hetero-nor-
mativity or the role of marriage essential, or proper, or central to the function of the concept FAMILY?
Our current practices do not allow to give a determinate answer to this question. Indeed, whether
these aspects are essential, proper, or central seems to be exactly what fuels many heated controver-
sies between subjects with different religious and ideological preferences in the contemporary public
sphere.
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4. A different strategy: semantically conservative and
progressive inquiries
We have reviewed two strategies to deal with the change of subject
objection: appealing to topics and appealing to concept function. Both
strategies are centred on some key element that is supposed to ensure
continuity of subject and of inquiry, but both have troubles offering cri-
teria of identification for it. Topic is unstable to the extent that samesay-
ing verdicts can be contested; and function is unstable to the extent that
judgments about its granularity can be contested too. Are there better
ways of dealing with the objection?
The topic and function strategies are examples of what, in the first
section, I identified as ‘reply option number (i)’ – namely, defending
subject continuity. The topic strategy pursues this reply by directly
offering a theory of subject that can ensure such continuity, while the
function strategy strives to achieve subject-continuity via continuity of
representational devices.7 In what follows, I will pursue what I identified
as ‘reply option number (ii)’ – namely, arguing that subject discontinuity
is not problematic. According to my proposal, one can admit that change
of subject occurred in certain key cases; yet, one can also maintain that
this need not affect inquiry continuity. How can such view be motivated?
In what follows, I suggest that one can distinguish between two ways
of approaching an inquiry centred on some initial, first-order question,
Q. First, I will draw attention on a ‘semantically conservative approach’,
according to which semantic change is not allowed during one’s
inquiry centred on Q. Second, I will draw attention on a ‘semantically pro-
gressive approach’, according to which semantic change is allowed. If the
initial first-order question Q is approached in a semantically progressive
way, one may say that it becomes embedded in a broader type of
inquiry, which we could call ‘Semantically Progressive Inquiry’ (SPI). A
SPI includes both first-order and meta-linguistic stages. By contrast, if Q
is approached in a semantically conservative way, it is embedded in a
type of inquiry that does not allow certain meta-linguistic issues to
arise. We could call it ‘Semantically Conservative Inquiry’ (SCI).
7There could be other strategies that pursue these broadly construed approaches. One may complain
that I am not ruling out such alternative strategies. While this is true, it would, however, be up to
the supporters of the broadly construed approaches to present these putative alternative strategies
and show their viability. As to my proposal, since it will ultimately rest on the idea of teleological con-
tinuity, I take it to depart from both the subject-continuity and the representational-device continuity
approaches.
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In the remainder of this section, I will provide some examples of SCI
and SPI. My aim is to convince the reader that these two categories are
not mere stipulations, but rather describe something that already exists
– although it is not yet labelled in terms of ‘SCI’ or ‘SPI’. Having argued
that SCIs and SPIs do exist, I will contend that explicitly engaging in a
SPI would benefit the inquirer targeted by the change of subject
objection.
4.1. Semantically conservative inquiry.
To better illuminate SCI, imagine a child who, addressing an adult, asks a
question with the goal of being educated about something: for instance,
‘Do fishes lay eggs?’ The adult’s response, in order to be appropriate,
ought to provide the child with insight into the current, shared definition
of what a fish is, as well as into the intension and extension of the word
‘fish’ as they are currently accepted in the ordinary language. No tinkering
with the definition and the semantics of ‘fish’ is expected or allowed.8
Similarly, a scientist may ask the plain, first-order question: ‘How many
exemplars of fish are there in the Lake Tohopekaliga?’ If all she aims for is
gathering data about the ichthyic population of the lake according to the
meaning of ‘fish’ currently accepted by the scientific community, and no
further reflection as to what a fish is, or what ‘fish’ means, is expected or
allowed, then her research is an example of SCI.
We thus have perfectly mundane cases of inquiries – centred on some
first-order question, Q – which it is arguably appropriate to describe in
terms of SCI, because they can consistently be reconstructed as ‘leaving
no room for’ (not expecting, or not allowing) changes in the semantics
of some key expression either contained in Q, or that is relevant to Q’s
answer (e.g. ‘fish’).
4.2. Semantically progressive inquiry
To illustrate SPI, consider the following case, also reported in detail by
Peter Ludlow (2014) and Mark Pinder (2020b). Up until the 1990s, the
word ‘planet’ as used by astronomers was associated with a certain
(more or less precise) definition. According to this definition, Pluto
8Neither the child nor the adult need be aware of any of the above. However, there is a reconstruction of
the child’s and adult’s exchange whereby it would be rational for them to assume that ‘fish’ has a
certain definition as well as a determinate intension and extension, and that any answer to the
initial question ought to give the asker access to them.
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counted as a planet. Yet, in 1992, astronomers began to find out that
Pluto was part of an asteroid belt, dubbed ‘Kuiper Belt’, which contained
numerous objects with the same chemical composition as Pluto, some of
which even larger than it (such as Eris, whose discovery was announced in
2005 (cf. Brown, Trujillo, and Rabinowitz 2005)). This would have meant
calling these objects ‘planets’ too. Yet, such result was deemed undesir-
able, as Steven Soter explains:
If Pluto is included as a planet, we have no physical basis for excluding Eris,
dozens of other large spherical [Kuiper Belt Objects], and Ceres. The term
‘planet’ would then lose any taxonomic utility. (Soter 2006, 2513)
This prompted the astronomers’ community to rethink the definition of
‘planet’. After a special Planet Definition Committee was appointed, the
International Astronomical Union gathered in Prague in 2006, in order
to vote a new and more precise definition of ‘planet’.
The experts’ decision9 arguably affected, through the division of
semantic labour, the very meaning of the term ‘planet’ as scientists use
it. In this scenario, we can imagine that the question ‘What is a planet?’
posed by the astronomers during their 2006 meeting was the start of a
SPI. Why so? Because the astronomers did not wish to answer that ques-
tion on the basis of the current definition (and term’s semantics) at the
time. Rather, they wanted to (i) work out a new definition, which would
in turn (ii) change the word’s meaning, which would in turn (iii) allow
to formulate a better answer to the initial question, in light of the new
discoveries.
Based on this example, wemay characterize a SPI as an inquiry in which
the subject (whether individual or collective) who asks the initial first-
order question, Q: (a) assumes that some expression occurring in Q, or rel-
evant for Q’s answer, has a suitably determinate meaning,10 (b) despite
9The decision is stated in resolution B5 of the International Astronomical Union (https://www.iau.org/
static/resolutions/Resolution_GA26-5-6.pdf).
10The inquirer could have a different assumption as well: that the key term they are ready to revise does
not have a determinate semantics. This is stressed by Haslanger, who writes: ‘[O]rdinary concepts are
notoriously vague’; as a consequence, ‘there is room to stretch, shrink, or refigure what exactly we
are talking about’ (Haslanger 2000, 34). This is echoed by Dutilh Novaes: ‘we users of ordinary
languages often do not know exactly what it is that we are talking about when using everyday life
vocabulary. At the very least, there is considerable leeway and flexibility in usage’ (2020, 1030).
(Recall, also, that a famous example of explication by Carnap (1950, 11–15) starts from the quite impre-
cise ‘cold’ and ‘warm’, and shows the process of their explication in terms of the more precise, quan-
titative concept ‘temperature’). If the inquirer assumes the indeterminacy of the concept under
scrutiny, their response against the change of subject objection may also be that, given the vagueness
of many of our concepts, there seems to be no subject to change. Although my proposal allows this
move, it provides a response to the change of subject objection that can also build on the assumption
that there is a determinate semantics and hence there is a ‘subject’, and that it is OK to change it
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this, the same subject is open to revise such meaning, in order to achieve a
certain purpose. Such purpose may relate to the agent’s pursuit of epis-
temic values (truth, accuracy, explanatory power), as well as non-episte-
mic values (practical convenience, applicability, but importantly also
values related to moral, social and political progress, like socio-economic
equality, democratization, emancipation, empowerment, sustainability).
Whether the envisaged semantic change is to have an epistemic or
non-epistemic import, the ensuing inquiry will likely consist of both
first-order and meta-linguistic stages.
If the reconstruction of the planet case is correct, there exists at least
one example of SPI that pre-dates my conjuring of the category ‘SPI’;
the category is therefore not a mere stipulation. Still, some more details
about this type of inquiry should be filled in.
First, what motivates an inquirer (or community thereof) to start a SPI?
The inquirer’s (or inquirers’) dissatisfaction with a certain category or ter-
minology, and their being open to definitional and semantic revisions to
achieve certain epistemic or non-epistemic goals, are arguably central
factors. In the case of Pluto, the category (and term) ‘planet’ came to
appear unsatisfactory, and the astronomers’ community became
expressly open to introducing definitional (and semantic) changes to
better achieve certain epistemic and non-epistemic goals – such as rep-
resentational accuracy or taxonomic expediency. Also questions like
‘What is a fish?’, ‘What is a gene?’, ‘What is a family?’ were perhaps, at
some point in history, asked with a semantically progressive attitude, in
light of the need to revise the attendant categories and terminologies
in order to achieve certain epistemic or non-epistemic benefits.
I do not wish to suggest that these projects were ever overtly framed in
terms of SPIs, or that someone engaged in a SPI need be immediately
aware that they are. In many cases, scientists may not even think of them-
selves as ‘revising a term’s intension and extension’. Still, if one could
reasonably reconstruct their inquiry as stemming from dissatisfaction
with a certain definition, category or terminology, and as making
certain semantic revisions permissible, one could legitimately portray
them as pursuing a SPI. If this were so, any first-order inquirer (or commu-
nity thereof) – be they natural scientists, social scientists, philosophers,
etc. – may turn out as a semantic revisionist. All it takes is an adequate
reconstruction of their inquiry in terms of SPI. Such reconstruction may
provided our inquiry has the right structure. I consider this a plus that the indeterminacy-based
response lacks.
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be adequate if, for example, it met with sufficient consensus inside the
very community conducting the first-order inquiry, or inside a community
that purports to give a historical account of that inquiry. In turn, the con-
sensus may be reached because the reconstruction itself exhibits some a
priori virtues such as being charitable; or, because it is confirmed by more
than one method of investigation; or, it finds support frommore than one
authoritative source.
4.3. The teleological unity of semantically progressive inquiry
Having engaged in a SPI, the inquirer, or the community of inquirers, may
reasonably expect, at the end of their investigation, an answer to the
initial question Q in which the semantics of a certain key expression e is
different from the semantics of e at the time of Q’s initial occurrence.
Moreover, since the inquirer, or the community thereof, was open to
semantic revision from the very beginning, they may, or even should,11
be ready to change the subject to some degree – especially in light of
the fact that semantic revision is the main culprit for subject-change.
How can they deal with inquiry discontinuity then? As I wish to
propose, they can argue that, even if subject-change happens, the conti-
nuity of inquiry need not be broken.
The inquirer(s) can contend that the unity of inquiry afforded by a
SPI is, at bottom, a teleological one. Suppose Erika’s inquiry starts on
June 7th, 1994 with the question ‘Is free will compatible with deter-
minism?’. If this question is part of a SPI, then semantic or subject
changes will not in appropriate circumstances jeopardize the continu-
ity of inquiry, because what keeps the various stages of Erika’s inquiry
together is the common goal of answering the question posed at the
beginning of her inquiry, on June 7th, 1994. In the course of a SPI,
such goal is presumably pursued by both (i) engaging in object-
level investigation and, (ii) when needed, by ascending at the metalin-
guistic level in order to operate semantic changes (although, as
already noted, this stage may figure only in an inquiry’s reconstruc-
tion, not necessarily in the inquirer(s)’ self-conception). If all goes
well, changes in intension and extension will not compromise such
teleological unity.
Of course, this is not tantamount to saying that all changes in
intension and extension will be allowed for the sake of teleological
11It would be tactically unwise to be open to semantic change, but not to subject change, for this would
certainly make one’s position vulnerable to the subject-change objection.
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inquiry continuity. If this were to happen, the continuity of a SPI
would become utterly trivial. It is entirely compatible with the
present approach that some changes of intension or extension may
go too far, and therefore cause a teleological discontinuity in a SPI,
for instance in causing the inquirer to drop the initial question, Q,
and to focus on a different question, R.
Yet, what makes a question the same or a different one? This will likely
have to be established on a case-by-case basis. The following examples
may, nevertheless, begin to shed light on what one’s guiding principles
would be. First, in the case of Erika’s revision of the free will concept,
one might argue that the initial question, Q (‘Is free will compatible
with determinism?’) still stands, because the notions of compatibility
and determinism have not been touched. Q still concerns whether ‘free
will’ – whatever content this word will acquire – is compatible with deter-
minism.12 In other cases, however, Q might undergo changes that ulti-
mately make it reasonable to discard it and replace it. Consider the
question ‘Are whales fish?’. Revising the concept WHALE implies revising
the concept FISH. If such revision were effected while investigating the
question ‘Are whales fish?’, it might cause one to lose sight of the very
question at issue, for it may be unclear whether ‘fish’ is to retain its
initial semantics or not. This unclarity might be a good reason for drop-
ping Q and for starting a new inquiry based on a different question, R,
phrased in more precise terms (for example: ‘Do whales breathe
through gills?’). In yet other cases, it might be reasonable to drop Q
entirely, without replacing it. Imagine that one’s initial question, Q, is:
‘Is phlogiston toxic?’, and imagine that, as a result of one’s inquiry, ‘phlo-
giston’ is ruled as extensionless. It seems like Q cannot be felicitously
asked anymore and has to be dropped.
These are, admittedly, just examples. Indeed, one may feel that the
identification conditions for questions are still too indeterminate. In
light of this indeterminacy, the critic may point out that the present pro-
posal fails to provide clear criteria for deciding whether a teleologically
unified SPI is the same or not, in a very similar fashion to its competitors:
the topic strategy, too, fails to provide criteria for inquiry-sameness by
failing to provide criteria of topic-sameness, and mutatis mutandis for
the function strategy. So why should one be drawn to the proposal
sketched so far?
12Thanks to Naomi Osorio-Kupferblum for helpful discussion on these issues.
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One significant advantage is that the notion of SPI, which includes a
metalinguistic and a teleological aspect, provides an additional level of
analysis for inquiries that allows one to capture the complexity and
instability of judgments concerning sameness and difference of subject.
This level of analysis is not accessible to the versions of the topic and func-
tion strategy presented in this paper and currently defended in the
literature.
To illustrate the advantage, let us return to Erika’s inquiry on free will.
The topic and function strategy would plausibly try to argue that the
subject of Erika’s inquiry did not change because the inquiry’s topic, or
the concept’s function, did not change. Yet, both topic-sameness and
function-sameness can be easily questioned, as I have argued previously.
What if there were an additional level of analysis where these sameness
judgments could be accommodated, so as to make it possible to hold
that something (let’s say, subject-matter) has changed, but also, something
else has remained the same? The idea of a SPI can do this job: it allows one
to state that, even though Erika’s subject matter changed, her ‘semanti-
cally progressive inquiry’ did not lose its continuity.
This additional level of analysis is not accessible to the topic and func-
tion strategies (as presented in Sections 2 and 3), which only focus on one
key element (topic or function), and therefore lack the right degree of
flexibility to accommodate cases in which sameness-judgments and
difference-judgments arise within the same conversational context.
Indeed, if these strategies subscribed to the idea of SPI, and of the meta-
linguistic and teleological unity of inquiry, they would plausibly have
access to this advantage. To my mind, then, this makes the SPI-based
strategy overall more attractive than its rivals: it offers tools that even
its rivals can benefit from.
The conclusion of this section is that one can set up one’s inquiry as a
SPI, in such a way that it is permissible to operate semantic revisions on
relevant key terms. Such revisions may lead one to changing the
subject, but still they won’t (in favourable circumstances) break the con-
tinuity of inquiry, because what crucially holds a SPI together is the goal of
answering the initial question, and not semantic or subject continuity.
5. Change of subject and semantically conservative vs.
progressive inquiries
The change of subject objection is problematic within a SCI, but need not
be so within a SPI. I will devote this section to comparing the impact of
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the subject change objection on a SCI and SPI respectively, and explain
how this can benefit conceptual engineering projects.
In the course of a SCI, if the answer to Q is not in line with the presup-
posed semantics of the key terms initially occurring in Q (be they known
or not by the questioner), it is in some sense infelicitous. The infelicity may
be explained as a lack of relevance: an answer in which the semantics of a
certain key term differs from the semantics of the same term as it occurred
in the question is strictly speaking irrelevant to the question itself. It fails
to answer the question that was originally posed. It may answer another
question that could have been posed, but in fact was not. This is perhaps
the sense in which the conceptual engineer fears ‘providing answers to
questions that weren’t being asked’ (Haslanger 2000, 34). The irrelevance
is made problematic by the fact that a SCI makes no provisions regarding
semantic changes along the way. Note that irrelevance is not a problem
per se, but only in relation to the expectations built into the structure of an
inquiry that is semantically conservative.
In a SPI, however, there need be no expectation that the semantics of
the key terms will stay the same. In addition, there may, or even should13
be a certain degree of openness to change of subject. If such a change
happens as the result of a revision of the intension and/or extension of
some key term occurring in the question, or that is relevant for answering
the question, this need not be a cause for concern, because the expec-
tations of the inquiry as it unfolds under a semantically progressive
approach would allow such change. Of course, as already mentioned,
not any change will be tolerated for the sake of teleological inquiry con-
tinuity. The extent of the permitted change might be set by the inquirer at
the beginning of the investigation, or even as the inquiry itself unfolds,
and is heavily dependent on contextual factors. Still, SPI allows a
degree of flexibility with respect to semantic and subject changes that
is altogether absent in a SCI.
As a consequence, if one’s inquiry is structured as a SPI, the change of
subject objection loses its bite, for it no longer points at an undesirable
outcome in light of the initial expectations of the inquiry. It points at an
outcome that is, or at any rate should reasonably be (under appropriate
conditions and to appropriate degrees) allowed, precisely in light of the
initial expectations of that kind of inquiry.
13Of course, the conceptual engineer is free to effect semantic changes while not being open to subject
change to any degree. As noted in fn. 11, however, this may be tactically unwise.
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Given that projects in conceptual engineering aim at assessing and, if
needed, improving semantic aspects of our concepts, there are good
reasons to believe that, when a conceptual engineer starts by asking
what seems to be an object-level question (e.g. ‘What is a woman?’, ‘Is
free will compatible with determinism?’), they intend to pursue a SPI, or
at least they should do so, as this would seem a reasonable way to
frame and carry out their investigation. If this were so, conceptual engin-
eers need not worry too much about the change of subject objection; for
the alleged problem flagged by the objector would simply be (in the
appropriate circumstances) a possible, expected outcome that is part of
the otherwise teleologically unified enterprise.
The previous considerations lead to a response that is partly a conces-
sion and partly a downplaying of the change of subject objection. It is a
concession, because it agrees that the objection points at something pro-
blematic for certain kinds of inquiries, namely SCIs. It is a downplaying,
because it shows that the change of subject phenomenon is (in appropri-
ate circumstances) factored into, and hence expected as a possible
outcome of, other kinds of inquiries, namely SPIs.
6. How to sidestep the change of subject objection
The same considerations also suggest the following advice for inquirers
who wish to deal with the change of subject objection. They should
become sensitive to whether their inquiry is carried out as a SCI or a
SPI and, if helpful, they should explicitly frame it as a SPI. This would
help them (at least partially) ‘immunize’ their projects from the change
of subject objection.
One could make it explicit that one’s inquiry is being carried out with a
semantically progressive attitude by formulating one’s questions and
answers accordingly. Suppose one were investigating the question ‘Is
marriage necessarily between aman and a woman?’ The inquirer sensitive
to the SCI vs. SPI difference should pause and ask: ‘Is it admissible for the
purposes of this inquiry to change any semantic aspect of the word ‘mar-
riage’ – thereby exposing this investigation to the possibility of changing
the subject?’ If yes, any such changes may be tracked at different stages of
the inquiry. First, they may be tracked in the way of formulating the initial
question, ‘factoring in’ the possibility of such modifications. This would
mean asking a more complex question like: ‘Are marriages (where the
semantics of ‘marriage’ is open to revision) necessarily such-and-such?’
Second, they may be tracked in the subsequent answer, which may be
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articulated along the following lines: ‘Yes/no, marriages (modulo such-
and-such semantic changes in the term ‘marriage’) are/are not necessarily
such-and-such’.
The formulations just recommended also help one address the follow-
ing worry, which may be called the question-answer mismatch worry.14
Suppose the initial question, Q, is individuated narrowly, that is, according
to the semantic content its occurrence has at the beginning of inquiry.
Suppose the answer, A, is also individuated narrowly, i.e. via the
content it has acquired at the end of the inquiry, which included semantic
revision. In this scenario, how can A really answer Q? Conversely, suppose
Q is narrowly identified, but A is not narrowly identified, that is, the
interpretation of A at the end of inquiry is left open. Why was Q narrowly
identified in the first place? This worry can be allayed by introducing a
metalinguistic element in both answer and question. Suppose I ask:
‘Are marriages (where the semantics of ‘marriage’ is open to revision)
necessarily such-and-such?’. This question can be relevantly answered
by uttering: ‘Yes/no, marriages (modulo such-and-such semantic
changes in the term ‘marriage’) are/are not necessarily such-and-such’.
If both question and answer refer to a metalinguistic stage in the
inquiry, their connection can be more clearly represented, and the ques-
tion-answer mismatch problem is less likely to arise.
The critical reader may at this point observe that the previous rec-
ommendations seem to suggest that framing one’s investigation as a
SPI is the easiest thing to do: all it takes is deliberately signal that one
is open to semantic and subject change. However, this deliberate
choice may be contested. If the objector argued compellingly that the
investigator’s inquiry should be carried out as a SCI, they could legiti-
mately level the subject-change charge.
In response, it may be tempting to argue that very few first-order inqui-
ries would be properly carried out as SCIs and that, in general, it is best to
situate one’s first-order inquiry within a SPI, as it is simplymore rational to
be ready to question the quality of one’s concepts than to accept them
uncritically (this thought is reflected in Cappelen’s (2018, 5–6) idea of ‘rep-
resentational skepticism’ as opposed to ‘representational complacency’).
Regardless of such wide-ranging (and a bit over-intellectualistic) con-
siderations about rational inquiry, though, one may simply point out
that, at least in the cases that matter for conceptual engineering, inquirers
usually have good reasons to suspect that certain key concepts should be
14I owe this objection to an anonymous referee.
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revised. For instance, the grounds Haslanger has to suspect that the con-
cepts of race and gender are covertly discriminatory – and hence call for
revision – seem to be supported by history, sociology and psychology.
The grounds Scharp has to regard the concept of truth as inconsistent
– and hence as calling for replacement – find adequate substantiation
in the liar paradox. Similar considerations seem to apply to other projects
that involve the concepts of knowledge, belief, moral goodness, etc. The
burden of proof would be on the objector to argue that nothing speaks in
favour of revising (or at least trying to revise) such concepts.
The objector could also note that the present account allows communi-
cation breakdowns to obtain after an inquiry has led to conceptual revi-
sion. Yet, these breakdowns would not matter to the present view, as
long as the teleological unity of inquiry could be maintained. That
seems like blatantly allowing subject change!
While it is true that misunderstandings and merely verbal disputes
could sometimes happen post-concept revision, the present proposal
also has the resources to show that semantic changes can be seamlessly
incorporated into a teleologically unified SPI. To achieve this, the actors
involved in the SPI should become more sophisticated in asking and
answering questions. This means, for example, asking questions that
explicitly signal the possibility of meaning change, like: ‘What are Fs
(where the semantics of “F” is open to revision)?’; or answering questions
by explicitly mentioning any semantic changes effected, like: ‘Fs (modulo
such-and-such change in the semantics of “F”) are Gs’. These more
complex questions and answers make it apparent that one’s inquiry has
both object-level stages and meta-level stages, which can be seen as con-
tinuous in virtue of their aiming towards the same goal – namely, answer-
ing the initial question. Thus, a more refined sensitivity towards
communication within an inquiry can reconcile unity and semantic
change.
Note that these would be good measures to take even if there were no
such thing as conceptual engineering. Languages evolve, and terms
change meaning across contexts and times, whether anybody deliber-
ately brings about these changes or not. So, paying attention to potential
semantic shifts, and injecting some ‘metalinguistic awareness’ in our
speech practices, are good policies no matter what.
A further objection comes from the externalist camp: ‘If externalism is
true, there can be no such thing as a semantically progressive inquiry’.
For, if they are fixed externalistically, neither the intension nor the exten-
sion of a concept can be changed by a semantically progressive inquirer.
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A way around this problem consists in arguing that, if externalism is true,
practitioners of SPI (and a fortiori, conceptual engineers) need only
change or improve those aspects of a concept that can actually be con-
trolled (cf. Riggs 2019).15 For instance, even if externalism is true, one
may engage in the project of manipulating speaker-meaning, as
opposed to semantic meaning, which is supposedly independent of the
beliefs and intentions of language users (Pinder 2019). Alternatively,
one might wish to intervene in the very external environment fixing
the relevant semantic facts, as suggested by Simion and Kelp (2020). If
this is so, then semantically progressive inquiries can be safely carried
out; one just needs to accept that they will change whatever aspects of
conceptual representations can be under the inquirer’s control, whether
or not externalism is true.
7. Conclusion
I have argued that theorists targeted by the change of subject objec-
tion may downplay such objection, by framing their inquiries as
Semantically Progressive Inquiries (SPIs). In a SPI, the terms – and
relatedly, the concepts – relevant to the investigation are allowed to
undergo semantic change. This may, for all the inquirer knows, lead
to a change of subject. In a SPI, though, subject-change need not
imply inquiry discontinuity, since inquiry continuity can be thought
of as teleological and metalinguistic, i.e. as tied to the overarching
goal of answering one’s initial question, Q, by going through both
first-order and meta-level steps (note that such continuity may result
from even just a reconstruction of the inquiry). In this picture, even
if a change of subject obtains, SPI need not be disrupted. As a
result, the change of subject objection loses its bite. Finally, potential
communication breakdowns can be prevented by increasing the
inquirers’ metalinguistic awareness.
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